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Actual-ideal and actual-ought self-discrepancies have been theorised to be independently 
associated with depressive and anxious symptoms respectively. This study tested this 
prediction and extended it to consider whether rumination mediates these relationships. One 
hundred and thirty-eight students (48 males, 90 females) listed four adjectives describing how 
they would ideally hope to be and four adjectives describing how they ought to be. 
Participants then rated how distant they perceived themselves to be from each of their ideal 
and ought selves, as well as the importance of each ideal and ought self. Finally, participants 
self-reported levels of negative rumination, anxious and depressive symptoms. Actual-ideal 
self-discrepancy was independently associated with both anxious and depressive symptoms, 
whereas actual-ought self-discrepancy was independently associated with anxious symptoms 
only. Rumination mediated the independent relationships between actual-ideal self-
discrepancy and anxious and depressive symptoms. Actual-ought self-discrepancy retained an 
independent association with anxious symptoms that was not mediated through rumination. 
Anxious and depressive symptoms both have independent associations with actual-ideal self-
discrepancies, whereas anxious symptoms are uniquely associated with actual-ought self-
discrepancies. We reveal further evidence for rumination as a cognitive-motivational 
transdiagnostic process linking self-regulatory difficulties with anxious and depressive 
symptoms. 
Keywords: actual-ideal and actual-ought self-discrepancies; rumination; anxious and 






Rumination selectively mediates the association between actual-ideal (but not actual-
ought) self-discrepancy and anxious and depressive symptoms 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Theorists have suggested that anxiety and depression share some cognitive, affective and 
behavioural features but have other features that are distinct (e.g., L. A. Clark, Watson, & 
Mineka, 1994; Mineka, Watson, & L. A. Clark, 1998). The tripartite model of anxiety and 
depression (L. A. Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994) suggests that these conditions share a 
common core of negative affect, with depression being distinguished by low positive affect 
and anxiety by autonomic hyperarousal. While these emotional states typically co-occur, the 
literature indicates that certain features differentiate anxiety and depression. Distinguishing 
the self-regulatory processes that have common versus distinct associations with anxiety and 
depression will further inform our understanding of the nature of these emotional 
symptoms. To date though, relatively little research has examined which self-regulatory 
processes have common and distinct relationships with anxiety and depression (but see 
Dickson & MacLeod, 2004a, 2004b, Winch, Moberly, & Dickson, 2015).  
Self-regulation theorists posit that aversive affective states result from an individual’s 
inability to regulate their perceived current state with respect to their desired states (Carver, 
2006; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1987, 1997; Dickson & Moberly, 2013; Dickson, 
Moberly, O’Dea, & Field, 2016).  Higgins’ (1997) regulatory focus theory (RFT) proposes 
that two basic components are involved in representations of future states used for self-
regulation: the valence of the anticipated goal outcome (positive vs. negative) and the 
orientation of the goal (promotion vs. prevention). Specifically, promotion-focused self-
regulation is sensitive to the presence or absence of positive outcomes (e.g., successfully 
achieving a good grade in an exam vs. failing to achieve a good grade in an exam) and is 
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accompanied by emotions ranging from elation to dejection. Thus, the absence or non-
attainment of a positive outcome is thought to give rise to emotions such as dejection, 
sadness, disappointment. On the other hand, prevention-focused self-regulation is sensitive to 
the absence or presence of negative outcomes (e.g., successfully avoiding a painful procedure 
vs. failing to avoid a painful procedure) and is accompanied by emotions ranging from relief 
to anxious agitation. Thus, the presence or proximity of a negative outcome is thought to give 
rise to emotions such as fear and anxiety. Consistent with prominent early two-system models 
of motivation (e.g., Gray, 1982) and extensions of these ideas to personal goals (e.g., Dickson 
& MacLeod, 2004a, 2004b; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997), promotion focus is approach-
oriented and thought to be activated by an appetitive motivational system.  Whereas, a 
prevention focus is superficially approach-orientated but is primarily motivated by an 
underlying avoidance tendency (e.g., pass my final year exam so I don’t feel a failure; Winch, 
Moberly, & Dickson, 2015). In this study, we test whether anxious and depressive symptoms 
are characterized by self-discrepancies with respect to the prevention and promotion system 
respectively, and whether these relationships are mediated by ruminative thinking. 
Higgins’ RFT was an extension of his earlier self-discrepancy theory (SDT; Higgins, 
1987), which suggested that people are motivated by hopes and aspirations (ideals) as distinct 
from duties and obligations (oughts; Higgins, 1997). Whereas ideal selves represent the 
presence of positive outcomes, ought selves represent the absence of negative outcomes (e.g., 
get a promotion, so as not to disappoint my partner). According to SDT, depressive 
symptoms arise due to actual-ideal (AI) discrepancies between the perceived actual self and 
the ideal self, whereas anxious symptoms arise due to actual-ought (AO) discrepancies 
between the perceived actual self and the ought self (Higgins, 1987). Self-regulation with 
respect to the ideal self corresponds to a promotion orientation. In this approach-oriented 
mode, the person tries to minimise AI self-discrepancies that represent the absence of positive 
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outcomes. By contrast, self-regulation with respect to the ought self corresponds to a 
prevention orientation. In this avoidance-oriented mode, the person strives toward duties and 
obligations, but the primary role these serve is to protect the person from unwanted outcomes. 
This motivational distinction explains why, according to SDT, AI self-discrepancies are 
associated with depressive symptoms whereas AO self-discrepancies are associated with 
anxious-agitation symptoms (e.g., Higgins, 1987, 1997).  
Studies have tested SDT’s prediction that AI and AO self-discrepancies are distinctly 
related to depressive and anxious symptoms respectively. Roney, Higgins, and Shah (1995) 
found that framing a goal in terms of positive gains (i.e., promotion focus) was associated 
with greater change in dejection than in anxious-agitated emotions among undergraduates, 
whereas the reverse was true when framing a goal in terms of negative losses (i.e., prevention 
focus). Scott and O’Hara (1993) found that clinically depressed students reported larger AI 
self-discrepancies than non-depressed students, whereas clinically anxious (or mixed 
anxious-depressive) students reported larger AO self-discrepancies than non-anxious 
participants. Nevertheless, some studies (e.g., Ozgul, Heubeck, Ward, & Wilkinson, 2003) 
have failed to find relationships between specific self-discrepancies and anxious and 
depressive affect. Boldero, Moretti, Bell, and Francis (2005) have argued that this may be 
because researchers have not appropriately investigated the affective correlates of one type of 
self-discrepancy when the other type of self-discrepancy is partialled out. Our first aim was to 
test whether depressive and anxious symptoms are independently and uniquely predicted by 
actual-ideal self-discrepancy and actual-ought self-discrepancy respectively. 
Although some studies have found that self-discrepancies on promotion goals are 
more strongly associated with depressive symptoms for people higher in trait rumination 
(Papadakis, Orr, & Strauman, 2009) it is also possible that ruminative states mediate the 
relationship between specific self-discrepancies and depressive and anxious symptoms. Given 
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that rumination is instigated by insufficient progress on personal goals (Martin & Tesser, 
1996; Moberly & Watkins, 2010; Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013), which are manifested 
abstractly as ideal and ought selves, large AI and AO self-discrepancies might be predicted to 
generate rumination. Goals that are pursued for avoidance motives are particularly strongly 
associated with rumination (Moberly & Dickson, 2016), suggesting that AO self-
discrepancies may contribute to rumination independently of AI self-discrepancies. To our 
knowledge, however, no study has tested this. Furthermore, given that rumination is related 
to a range of mood disorder psychopathology including anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008), the second aim of our study was to test whether the association between distinct self-
discrepancies and depressive and anxious symptoms would be mediated by rumination. 
Despite its plausibility, few studies have considered rumination as a mediator of the 
unique associations between self-discrepancies and anxious and depressive symptoms. 
Roelofs, Papageorgiou, Gerber, Huibers, Peeters, and Arntz (2007) found good fit for a 
model in which trait rumination mediated the relationship between individual self-
discrepancies, beliefs about rumination and depressive symptoms. Hong, Triyon, and Ong 
(2013) found that AI and AO self-discrepancies were each positively associated with 
brooding (a particularly negative self-evaluative form of rumination), but found no evidence 
that brooding mediated the interaction between self-discrepancies and neuroticism in 
predicting anxious and depressive symptoms. Caselli et al. (2014) found that state brooding 
mediated the effects of an actual-ideal self-discrepancy induction (compared with neutral 
self-focus) on negative mood. Another experimental study by Jones, Papadakis, Orr, and 
Strauman (2013) found that rumination exacerbated the negative affect associated with goal 
failure, particularly for promotion goals. However, no study has yet examined whether 
rumination mediates the independent relationships between distinct AI and AO self-
discrepancies and depressive and anxious symptoms respectively. 
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 To test this, we asked participants to list four ideal-self attributes and four ought-self 
attributes and rate how distant their perceived actual-self was from each of their ideal-self and 
ought-self attributes. In addition, participants completed self-report measures of ruminative 
thinking and anxious and depressive symptoms. Because we conceptualised rumination as a 
mediator that is contingent on AI and AO self-discrepancies that may fluctuate, we asked 
people to rate the extent to which they engaged in rumination over the last two weeks. 
1.1 Hypotheses 
Based on self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987), we hypothesised that AI (but not 
AO) self-discrepancies would be independently associated with depressive symptoms 
whereas AO (but not AI) self-discrepancies would be independently associated with anxious 
symptoms. Based on the notion that unattained goals instigate rumination (Martin & Tesser, 
1996) and that rumination exacerbates psychological distress (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), 
we expected that AI and AO self-discrepancies would each predict unique variance in 
rumination, and that rumination would at least partially mediate the unique associations 
between AI and AO self-discrepancies and depressive and anxious symptoms respectively. 
2.  METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
One hundred and thirty-eight university students (48 male, 90 female) participated. 
The mean age of participants was 22.4 years (SD = 4.6, range = 18-49). Our sample size was 
calculated to achieve power of .80 to detect mediation based on small-to-medium sized 
effects (f²  =.07) for (i) the unique relationships between specific self-discrepancies and 
rumination, and (ii) the unique relationship between rumination and anxious or depressive 




2.2.1 Actual-Ideal (AI) and Actual-Ought (AO) Self Discrepancy. A modified 
version of the computerised selves task (Shah & Higgins, 2001) was used to measure AI and 
AO self-discrepancies. Participants were asked to generate four adjectives that describe how 
they ideally hope to be (ideal selves) and four adjectives that describe how they ought to be 
(ought selves). Participants rate how distant their current self is from each attribute on a 7-
point scale from 1 (not at all far away) to 7 (extremely far away). Scores for each adjective 
are summed so that total scores range from 4 to 28, with higher scores indicating greater 
discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal or ought self. In this study, the AI self-
discrepancy measure and the AO self-discrepancy measure demonstrated acceptable internal 
consistency (α = .74 and .72 respectively).  
2.2.2 Ideal/ought self importance ratings.  To check that participants were generating 
personally important self-attributes, each ideal-self and ought-self attribute was rated for 
subjective importance using a single item scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).  
2.2.3 Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire—modified (PTQ; Ehring et al., 2011), 
Rumination was assessed using a modified version of the PTQ, comprising 15 items that 
capture the tendency to engage in repetitive thinking about negative experiences or problems 
(e.g., “The same thoughts keep going through my mind again and again”). Importantly, this 
measure was designed to be symptom-independent and to capture both worry and rumination. 
Original instructions were modified to ask respondents how often the items described them 
over the past two weeks to assess recent repetitive negative thinking. Each item is scored on a 
5-point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (almost always). Total scores range from 0 to 60, 
with higher scores indicating more rumination (α = .95).  
2.2.4 Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). 
Depressive symptoms were assessed using the PHQ-9, which measures how frequently over 
the past two weeks participants experienced each of nine symptoms consistent with DSM-IV 
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(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for a major depressive episode. Each 
statement is scored on a 4-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day), and graded 
in severity. Total scores range from 0 to 27 (α = .89). 
2.2.5 Generalized Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7; Spitzer, Williams, Kroenke, & Löwe, 
2006). Anxious symptoms were assessed using the GAD-7, which measures how often they 
have experienced each of seven anxious symptoms over the past two weeks. Each item is 
scored on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (nearly every day). Total scores 
range from 0 to 21 (α = .88). 
2.3 Procedure 
The study had university ethical approval.  All participants provided informed consent 
before completing the self-report questionnaires online in the order presented above. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Analysis plan 
Data screening revealed no outliers (z-scores < ±3) and approximately normally 
distributed variables with the distribution of Mahalanobis distances indicating multivariate 
normality. After examining bivariate correlations, we conducted path analyses using 
maximum likelihood estimation in MPlus version 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). First, we 
tested whether AI and AO self-discrepancies independently predicted depressive and anxious 
symptoms respectively. AI and AO self-discrepancy were included as simultaneous 
predictors, with anxious and depressive symptoms as parallel outcomes with correlated 
residuals. We then tested whether rumination significantly mediated the relationships 
between each form of self-discrepancy and depressive and anxious symptoms by including 
rumination as a mediator in the previous model. Our models were just-identified and our 
focus was not on model fit but on the path coefficients and whether rumination significantly 
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mediated the relationship between each type of self-discrepancy and each form of 
psychological distress. Significance of indirect effects was tested using bias-corrected 
bootstrapped standard errors (10,000 samples) and noting whether the 95% confidence 
interval for each indirect effect included zero.  
3.2 Descriptive statistics and correlations  
 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for the study variables are reported in 
Table 1. Ideal (M = 5.4, SD = 1.6) and ought (M = 5.4, SD = 1.6) selves were rated as 
similarly important, with most ratings at the higher end of the scale. Importance of self-
discrepancy was not significantly associated with any variable although the importance of 
ideal and ought selves was positively correlated, r = .58, p < .001. AI and AO self-
discrepancies were positively correlated with rumination, depressive and anxious symptoms, 
which were strongly intercorrelated.  Age and gender did not correlate significantly with any 




Insert Table 1 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3.3 Testing the unique relationships between different types of self-discrepancy and 
anxious and depressive symptoms 
 We report the standardised path coefficients for the first model in Figure 1. AI and 
AO self-discrepancies jointly explained 15.2% of the variance in depressive symptoms, and 
12.5% of the variance in anxious symptoms, ps < .001. As hypothesized, AO self-
discrepancy was significantly and independently associated with anxious but not depressive 
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symptoms. Unexpectedly, AI self-discrepancy was significantly and independently associated 
with both depressive and anxious symptoms.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
3.4 Testing rumination as a mediator of the relationship between self-discrepancy and 
psychological symptoms 
 We report the standardised coefficients for the mediational path model in Figure 2. AI 
and AO self-discrepancy jointly predicted 15.1% of the variance in rumination, p = .009. AI 
self-discrepancy, AO self-discrepancy and rumination jointly explained 40.4% of the 
variance in depressive symptoms, and jointly explained 42.9% of the variance in anxious 
symptoms, ps < .001. AI self-discrepancy was significantly and independently associated 
with rumination, whereas AO self-discrepancy was not. In turn, rumination was a significant 
predictor of both depressive and anxious symptoms after controlling for AI and AO self-
discrepancy. After controlling for rumination, AI self-discrepancy did not retain a significant 
independent association with either anxious or depressive symptoms, whereas AO self-
discrepancy retained a significant independent association with anxious but not depressive 
symptoms. 
 These results were consistent with rumination mediating the relationship between AI 
(but not AO) self-discrepancy and both depressive and anxious symptoms. Bootstrapped 
confidence intervals revealed that rumination was a significant mediator of both (i) the 
relationship between AI self-discrepancy and depressive symptoms, unstandardized effect = 
0.97, 95% CI [0.47, 1.56], standardized effect = .19, 95% CI [.09, .30] and (ii) the 
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relationship between AI self-discrepancy and anxious symptoms, unstandardized effect = 
0.85, 95% CI [0.43, 1.31], standardized effect = .20, 95% CI [.10, .31]. Rumination neither 
significantly mediated the relationship between AO self-discrepancy and depressive 
symptoms, unstandardized effect = 0.22, 95% CI [–0.35, 0.74], standardized effect = .04, 
95% CI [–.06, .15], nor that between AO self-discrepancy and anxious symptoms, 
unstandardized effect = 0.19, 95% CI [–0.29, 0.66], standardized effect = .04, 95% CI [–.06, 
.16]. Rumination mediated 66% of the independent association between AI self-discrepancy 
and depressive symptoms and 87% of the independent association between AI self-
discrepancy and anxious symptoms. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
4. DISCUSSION 
Our findings do not support the prediction derived from self-discrepancy theory 
(Higgins, 1987) that AI self-discrepancies are independently and uniquely associated with 
depressive symptoms, because AI self-discrepancies were also independently associated with 
anxious symptoms. Consistent with self-discrepancy theory, AO self-discrepancies were 
independently associated with anxious affect. Our more original contribution is the finding 
that rumination selectively mediates the independent relationships between AI self-
discrepancies (but not AO self-discrepancies) and both anxious and depressive symptoms. 
Carver and Scheier (1998) suggested that ideal self-regulation represents a relatively 
pure form of approach motivation whereas ought self-regulation is principally motivated by 
the desire to avoid a negative outcome (e.g., ‘I ought to be academic, so my parents will not 
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be disappointed in me’). Motivational theories of psychopathology (e.g., Fowles, 1994) 
suggest that depression is characterised by reduced approach motivation and increased 
avoidance motivation, whereas anxiety is characterised by increased avoidance motivation. 
Taking these theoretical accounts together, the finding that AI self-discrepancy independently 
predicted anxious as well as depressive symptoms is difficult to reconcile with an 
understanding of AI self-discrepancy as uniquely relevant to approach motivation. Ideal 
selves may evoke anxious uncertainty about whether they can be attained. Given that other 
studies have failed to find differentiated associations between particular symptoms and self-
discrepancies (e.g., Ozgul et al., 2003), AI self-discrepancies may not be as motivationally 
pure as self-discrepancy theory suggests, particularly in young adult populations who remain 
involved in a developmental stage of identity formation during which ideals and oughts are 
under negotiation. Although the independent association between AO self-discrepancies and 
anxious symptoms supported self-discrepancy theory, the magnitude of the AO-anxious and 
AO-depressive symptom path coefficients was very similar. 
As expected on the basis of transdiagnostic models (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), 
both anxious and depressive symptoms were positively associated with rumination. 
Unexpectedly, however, only AI self-discrepancy (and not AO self-discrepancy) predicted 
independent variance in rumination. Although the goal progress model (Martin & Tesser, 
1996) suggests that a discrepancy on any important goal may instigate rumination, we 
originally speculated that an independent association would obtain for AO self-discrepancy. 
This originated from our assumption that the salient (though covert) avoidance motives that 
predominate in ought-based self-regulation would encourage monitoring for undesirable 
outcomes and hence rumination (Moberly & Dickson, 2016). In fact, when rumination was 
included in the model, the AO self-discrepancy retained a direct relationship with anxious 
symptoms that was not mediated by rumination. Although Moberly and Dickson (2016) 
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found evidence that people were most likely to ruminate about goals that they pursued for 
avoidant reasons, they did not collect data on the extent to which people were experiencing 
discrepancies in relation to goal attainment or progress, which may explain the different 
pattern of findings. Furthermore, the evolutionary necessity to take urgent action may dictate 
that proximity to a negative outcome (indicated by a large AO discrepancy) generates 
anxious arousal through a more direct route than ruminative contemplation. 
Taken together with the finding that AI self-discrepancy indiscriminately predicted 
both anxious and depressive symptoms, the asymmetric relationship between AI and AO self-
discrepancy and rumination may be explained by differences in other processes relating to 
participants’ ideal and ought selves. Although no significant differences emerged on either 
the magnitude or importance of participants’ ideal versus ought selves, a slower perceived 
rate of discrepancy reduction with respect to ideal versus ought selves may have resulted in 
greater rumination for a constant level of discrepancy (Martin & Tesser, 1996). Alternatively, 
people may have entertained particularly optimistic standards for desired rate of progress 
toward their ideal selves, contributing to rumination and negative affect. Future studies could 
test these possibilities while attempting to replicate our findings. 
Our study was the first to reveal that rumination selectively mediated the association 
between AI self-discrepancy and both depressive and anxious symptoms. This suggests that 
AI self-discrepancy is associated with psychological distress to the extent that it is 
accompanied by repetitive self-focus on that discrepancy. Previous studies (e.g., Roelofs et 
al., 2007) did not examine whether rumination mediated independent relationships for AI and 
AO self-discrepancies. Our finding that rumination selectively mediated the link between AI 
self-discrepancy and distress is consistent with results from an experimental paradigm 
demonstrating that rumination triggered by promotion goal failure (moreso than prevention 
goal failure) was likely to intensify negative affect (Jones et al., 2013). These results are 
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important in that they indicate that the transdiagnostic process of ruminative thinking serves 
as a lynchpin between motivational representations of the future self and psychological 
distress. 
Although Scott and O’Hara (1993) found elevated self-discrepancies in clinically 
depressed and anxious samples, future research could test whether rumination is causally 
implicated in the relationship between self-discrepancies and clinical episodes of depression 
and generalised anxiety. Nevertheless, the following suggestions can be tentatively drawn 
from our data. First, self-discrepancies with respect to the ideal self may not be inherently 
problematic if a person adopts a mindful stance toward them and does not engage in negative 
ruminative thinking (Watkins, 2018). Indeed, holding positive future self-representations has 
been found to be an important contributor to well-being (MacLeod, 2017). Second, self-
discrepancies with respect to the ought self may generate anxiety that is more difficult to 
downregulate. Although a prevention-based mode of regulation is appropriate in some 
circumstances, clients might be encouraged to work toward positive representations of the 
future self that are self-concordant, attainable and not undergirded by avoidance. 
Some methodological limitations deserve comment. First, the cross-sectional design 
means that we cannot infer causality. Unmeasured variables that correlate with rumination 
may be responsible for the link between AI self-discrepancy and psychological distress. 
However, we found no evidence for a reverse mediation model in which symptoms mediated 
the relationship between self-discrepancies and rumination. Further, the GAD-7 is a 
generalised measure of anxiety and as such is highly correlated with depression. Therefore, it 
is possible that a more fear-based measure of anxiety (e.g., BAI) may not have shown the 
same mediated effect of rumination between AI self-discrepancy and anxious symptoms. This 
awaits further investigation. Second, we tested a student sample and our findings are not 
necessarily generalisable to community or clinical populations. Although our sample scored 
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across the range of depressive and anxious symptoms, 51% reported minimal to mild levels 
of depressive symptoms, and 65% reported minimal to mild levels of anxious symptoms. 
Therefore, future research is needed to investigate whether the findings are replicable in 
clinical samples. Our research relied on self-report measures and an idiographic selves 
questionnaire. Future research would benefit from implicit measures of self-discrepancy, 
which would provide greater confidence that the association between self-discrepancy, 
rumination and symptoms is not due to shared method variance.  
4.1 Conclusions 
Our findings contribute to the evidence that distinct forms of self-discrepancy may not 
have independent relationships with specific forms of psychological distress, as predicted by 
self-discrepancy theory. Moreover, our results provide further evidence that rumination 
serves as a transdiagnostic process that links self-regulatory processes of relevance to 
motivation to psychological distress. Strauman et al. (2006) found that an intervention 
targetting promotion goal pursuit is effective in reducing dysphoric responses to ideal selves 
in depressed persons. Our results suggest that the efficacy of such therapies may in part be 
due to a reduction in rumination and consequent reductions in anxious and depressive 
symptoms. It remains for future research to determine the extent to which these relationships 
emerge over time and contribute to clinical levels of psychological disorder. 
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We conducted three exploratory hierarchical multiple regression analyses to test 
whether the two interactions between actual/ideal self-discrepancy and the corresponding 
importance of actual/ideal self jointly explained additional variance in (i) depressive 
symptoms, (ii) anxious symptoms, and (iii) rumination. In no case was significant additional 
variance explained, Fs(2, 131) < 0.50, ps > .61. Thus, self-discrepancy did not interact with 
importance of ideal/ought self to predict rumination, anxious or depressive symptom
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation coefficients among study variables (N = 138) 
 AO PHQ-9 GAD-7 PTQ M (SD) 
1. AI .43*** .36*** .32*** .38*** 3.57 (1.29) 
2. AO - .29*** .30*** .23** 3.33 (1.24) 
3. PHQ-9  - .71*** .61*** 10.14 (6.61) 
4. GAD-7   - .63*** 7.63 (5.39) 
5. PTQ    - 31.96 (13.45) 
Note. AI = Actual-Ideal Self-Discrepancy; AO = Actual-Ought Self-Discrepancy; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire – 9; GAD-7 = 






Figure 1. Standardised path coefficients for the model in which AI and AO self-discrepancy predict depressive and anxious symptoms. * p < 






























Figure 2. Standardised path coefficients for the model in which rumination mediates the relationships between AI and AO self-discrepancy and 
depressive and anxious symptoms. * p < .05. *** p < .001. 
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